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Economic Impact Analysis:
The EPA Perspective
RONALD EvANs'
I will set the framework for what we will try to accom-
plish with the economic analysis for the new particulate mat-
ter (PM) and ozone air quality standards. Economic analysis
is referred to as the dismal science. I happen to enjoy it. I
think it does have value, even though it is not considered
within the specifics of the setting of air quality standards.
When you read the newspapers, hear the debates within Con-
gress, or hear the communications here, economics is often
discussed and debated.
As indicated, I am the leader of the group that was re-
sponsible for putting together the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) cost/benefit study. There were
close to twenty-five people that contributed to this. As you
heard from previous speakers, the framework for the Clean
Air Act (CAA) 2 does not allow economic factors to be consid-
1. Mr. Evans is the leader for Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) economic analysis team,
the Innovative Strategies and Economics Group. The Innovative Strategies and
Economics Group develops methodologies and conducts analyses of cost-bene-
fits and economic and other regulatory impacts of air quality management
strategies, programs and regulations, with a particular focus on non-utility sta-
tionary sources of air pollution. This group also provides leadership for OAQPS'
economic incentive and other innovative regulatory programs. Mr. Evans has
been with EPA since 1979. He has held a variety of economic and policy related
positions in EPA since that time. He served as an economic and policy analyst
in the EPA Toxic Substances Office, which regulates the introduction of new
chemical substances. He has also led EPA's effort to develop regulations gov-
erning the release of non-pesticidal genetically engineered microorganisms into
the environment. He was director of EPA's Office of Research & Development
Air Quality Assurance division until taking over the Air Economics Office in
Durham, North Carolina.
2. See Clean Air Act §§ 101-618q, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671(1990).
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ered in setting the new NAAQS.3 But, under Executive Or-
der 12866,4 the EPA is charged, along with all other federal
regulatory agencies, to complete an economic analysis for any
major rule.5 While it was not part of the decision-making
process, the economic analysis was intended to help policy-
makers understand how these rules fit into the continuum of
decisions that need to be made. As you previously heard,
these new standards have a greater impact than any individ-
ual rule that EPA has promulgated, not only under CAA, but
also under most other authorities.
I will begin by talking about some of the caveats and lim-
itations used to calculate the numbers involved in a cost-ben-
efit analysis. We tried to conduct an analysis of a random
period in the future. The year 2010 was chosen because it is
far enough in the future to provide enough time for most of
the areas to be able to attain the NAAQS. In contrast, the
law provides that areas will be able to go beyond that period
in order to reach the new air quality standards. For example,
for ozone, that period is approximately the year 2012.6 For
PM, it actually extends out to the year 2017. When we com-
pleted our initial draft analysis, we did not try to project what
it would take for everyone to reach the attainment of the new
standards by 2010. There was a great deal of public comment
about not projecting the costs and benefits of full attainment.
Therefore, you have before you two types of analyses.
One looks at the partial attainment of the new standards.
This is what we believe, given the current state of control
technology, the costs and benefits would be for meeting the
new standards under a hypothetical implementation scheme
in 2010. We extended that, using what I would refer to as the
"back of the envelope" assumptions, to come up with some-
thing that is labeled "full attainment cost projection." Again,
3. See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards,
40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1997).
4. See Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (1998).
6. See U.S. EPA Office of Air & Radiation, Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standards Fact Sheet (last modified July 17, 1998) <http://ttn.www.rtpnc.
epa.gov/naaqsfin/impfac.htm>.
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these estimates are for the year 2010, before EPA would re-
quire absolute attainment. The partial attainment numbers
result from a model that is subject to many limitations. Look-
ing at the "back of the envelope" calculation for full attain-
ment also leads us to some of the same conclusions about the
benefits and costs, as did the more certain results.
In developing the full attainment estimates, an arbitrary
figure was derived based on the experience of what is a rea-
sonable cost of control in various pollution programs, particu-
larly California, and in other areas. We found that $10,000
per ton for either nitrogen oxide (NO.) compounds or hydro-
carbons is an upper bound that people are willing to pay to
remove pollution. We, therefore, used that as our number for
this "back of the envelope" calculation. In understanding how
analysis can drive policy, we selected for our analysis what
was included in the President's statement on implementa-
tion.7 It is now the goal of both the EPA and the states to
insure that these new NAAQS are implemented in a fashion
that stays below this $10,000 per ton limitation.
The President used this $10,000 figure as a maximum.
This is a new type of limitation on what people have put in
place to reach these new standards. It is going to be an inter-
esting thing, from an economics point of view, to see how this
limitation affects the development of new technology and in-
novation, not only the technology, but also the manner in
which the controls are put in place.
What you see in this economic analysis and in these par-
tial attainment results is what happens when we look at the
costs and benefits of both PM and ozone. I am comfortable in
saying that the result will be that the benefits will always
exceed the costs. The analysis supports the science and the
Administrator made the right decision in going forward with
these new NAAQS, from the point of view of the total
economy.
When you break these two apart and look only at PM, as
presented here, that still remains true. It is a different story
7. See Implementation of the Revised Air Quality Standards for Ozone and
Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,421 (1997).
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when you look at the economics for the ozone standard. In
terms of the ozone, the benefits approximate the costs, within
the bounds of uncertainty, of the numbers that you see before
you. I think that it is not a bad deal to regulate the ozone,
from the point of view of the nation, but it is not an over-
whelmingly good deal. That is the best way to describe it.
This morning we have heard criticisms regarding how
EPA did its calculations, particularly concerning mortality
evaluations and that EPA picked a course that, in fact, would
put a high benefit there. Although we heard something dif-
ferent from a couple of the panelists here, the high end of the
ranges tried to be reasonable, in terms of a value of mortality
that is generally accepted by the economics community. We
are looking at a value of life of $4.8 million. We have used the
assumptions of our critics in the low end of these two esti-
mates. One assumption is to completely delete, in the case of
ozone, any mortality estimates, so the bottom figure here is
not presuming there is any ozone mortality whatsoever from
the exposure to ozone. However, you heard George Thurston
say earlier that the scientists claim there is mortality from
exposure to ozone. In the case of the PM, what we have done
is try to come up with a different method of evaluation that
looks at the value of life years saved. Although, it signifi-
cantly reduces the value of a life as calculated here, the
method demonstrates that even though we use the most con-
servative assumption for the value of life, it still turns out to
be a good deal in terms of the regulation of PM.
I would like to explain some caveats and limitations.
This analysis, by definition, is loaded with assumptions, cave-
ats and uncertainties. What we try to do within our analysis
and with some success is to be as transparent as possible for
people to understand what those limitations are. In general,
I agree with my critics that there are shortcomings to these
analyses, but we try to put together analyses that are as good
as science allows. There are several cases where we do not
have enough information. In the case of the emissions inven-
tory, you have already heard that there is not much monitor-
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ing data for PM2.5.8 EPA had our expert scientists calculate
ratios for PM2.5 and PM10 to help, not only the modeling for
the economic analysis, but also for the setting of the standard
itself. The scientists think that it is a reasonable approxima-
tion, at least the one we relied on. Time will tell whether that
is correct.
Similarly, you heard John Vandenberg say that we must
look at models of pollutants, one at a time. Let us look at the
ozone model. Let us look at the PM model. Let us look at the
SO 2 model. In the future, we hope that there will be a model
that looks at the interaction of all the pollutants. That will
have a great impact on the costs and benefits because then
you can look at the impact of the joint controls.
We now know, that if a certain type of control is placed
on a utility, it eliminates both ozone and PM from the atmos-
phere. In our analysis, we tried to account for that interac-
tion, but our ability to model that interaction.
In addition, there are many categories of benefits that we
know ozone and PM have an effect on that we have no way of
putting a dollar value on. I believe that John talked about
the decrease of lung function from exposure to ozone. What is
the value of losing 10% of lung function? No one has a
formula to place a value on that. Hopefully, in the future, we
will know whether or not it has a value or whether it is im-
portant. Right now, we do not know what it really means.
In closing, I want to talk about a point that was raised
earlier in the presentation, about UVB and the issue of
whether or not EPA should be looking at the disadvantages of
controlling ozone and the increase in skin cancer that result
from controlling the ozone level of air which we breathe. We
took a look at that within the body of economic analysis and
tried to come up with estimates. The bottom line, when mete-
orologists and health scientists review the numbers, is that
the uncertainties surrounding the results of the modeling are
so large that the resulting numbers are not trustworthy. In
8. See U.S. EPA Office of Air & Radiation, Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standards Fact Sheet (last modified July 17, 1998) httpJ/ttn.www.rtpnc.
epa.gov/naaqsfin/impfac.htm.
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the next few years, we are going to try to address that. While
the standard itself cannot complete a risk-risk tradeoff,
within the economic analysis, we can mention it and it should
appear the next time the standard comes up.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/6
